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Down-Zoning and Exclusionary Zoning
in California Law
by MICHAEL A. WILLEMSEN* and GAIL V. PHILLIPS**

For many years virtually every community in California endorsed
the philosophy of growth. Zoning ordinances in this milieu served
merely to guide growth and eliminate nuisances. Within the past two
decades, however, opposition to largely unrestrained growth has arisen
and attained political power. In many communities the opponents of
growth, seeking to preserve the natural and social environment and to
reduce the burden on local government that accompanies growth, have
succeeded in enacting zoning ordinances designed to severely limit future development. Similar restrictive provisions enacted by the state
government have limited development along the Pacific Coast' and in
the Lake Tahoe Basin. 2 The next few years may see the enactment of a
statewide land use planning law which will further limit the conversion
of undeveloped and agricultural land to residential or commercial use.
Restrictive zoning ordinances give rise to two distinct yet related
issues. The first issue is one of "down-zoning": by limiting the landowner's use of property, the ordinance may invade constitutionally protected rights, either by restricting the use of property to uses less
valuable than those previously permitted, or by threatening to deny
any reasonable use whatsoever. The second issue is one of "exclusionary zoning": by limiting the construction of housing, a restrictive zoning ordinance may deny prospective immigrants the opportunity to live
in the community. Although earlier cases evaluated the exclusionary
* A.B., M.A., 1959, L.L.B., 1962, Stanford University. Member, California State Bar.
This author has served as a research attorney on the staff of the California Supreme Court
since 1969. The opinions expressed in this Article are the views of the authors and not
necessarily those of the court or any justice thereof.
** B.A., 1975, M.B.A., 1977, California State University, Los Angeles. Member,
Third Year Class.
1. See California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West
1977 & Supp. 1979).
2. See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66801 (West Supp.
1966-1978); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 67000-67130 (West .Supp. 1966-1978) (establishing the
California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency).
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character of zoning laws in terms of their impact on the landowner's
property rights, recent decisions demonstrate that such laws must be
tested instead by their impact on the welfare of the surrounding region.
The exclusionary character of an ordinance thus presents an issue conceptually distinct from its effect on property rights.
This Article presents a critical analysis of current California law
on the issues of down-zoning and exclusionary zoning. With respect to
down-zoning, California law has taken a unique course, rendering decisions of other jurisdictions of little relevance to the California practitioner. There are, however, few California decisions on exclusionary
zoning, so we discuss here the leading decisions of other jurisdictions
which may prove influential in the development of California law. Finally, we consider the impact of recently enacted statutes and regulations requiring a housing element in city and county general plans
upon future exclusionary zoning decisions.
Down-Zoning
Typically, complaints alleging that zoning restrictions violate
landowners' rights arise when opponents of growth, having attained
political power in the community, change the zoning on property to a
classification barring valuable uses previously permitted. This change
in zoning is known as "down-zoning." Since HFN, Ltd v. Superior
Court,3 however, California law has held that constitutional issues are
raised by the character of the restrictions on land use, not the change in
the zoning classification. A change in zoning from one reasonable use
to another presents no controversy; an ordinance which permits no reasonable use raises substantial issues even though it represents no
change from prior zoning. Nevertheless, because cases and commentators alike refer to zoning which unreasonably restricts the use of property as "down-zoning," that term is used in this Article.
The following discussion focuses on three major cases. The first,
HFN, Ltd v. Superior Court,4 represents the California approach to
down-zoning. In simplest form, it stands for the proposition that mere
diminution in value will not suffice to state a cause of action for inverse
condemnation;5 that overly restrictive zoning is to be challenged by a
writ of mandamus, not by an action for inverse condemnation. The
3.
4.

15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).

5. Inverse condemnation is defined as a proceeding in eminent domain brought by the
landowner rather than the city to force condemnation of the plaintiff's land or an interest in
that land and payment of just compensation therefor.
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second, Eldridgev. City of PaloAlto, 6 held that a restrictive zoning law,
although valid under the police power, could constitute a taking. That7
proposition was repudiated in the third case, Agins v. City of Tiburon.
In Agins, the California Supreme Court definitively addressed certain
questions left open by the HFH court,8 delineating both the appropriate remedy and theory upon which to challenge an unconstitutionally
restrictive zoning ordinance.
HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court
Discussion of down-zoning in current California law centers
around the decision in HFH, Ltd v. Superior Court.9 Plaintiffs sought
a writ of mandate following an order sustaining a demurrer to their
complaint. Plaintiffs agreed to purchase unimproved property in an
agricultural zone on the condition that the seller procure commercial
zoning. Commercial zoning was obtained and the sale consummated.
When five years later plaintiffs had not developed the property, the city
down-zoned the land to permit only residential use. Plaintiffs brought
suit, alleging that their land was useless for residential purposes and
that the down-zoning reduced its market value from $400,000 to
$75,000, an eighty percent reduction. The issue before the appellate
court was whether such allegations stated a cause of action for inverse
condemnation. The court of appeal, in a split decision, overturned the
trial court and held the complaint sufficient. 10 Plaintiffs, the court
ruled, had the right to prove at trial that the city's zoning action was not
in the public interest or that the property owner was being "unfairly
burdened with a cost of improving the public welfare which in justice
ought to be borne by the public."" In dissent, Justice Fleming argued
that the owner's only remedy lay in an action for mandamus to invalidate the zoning,' 2 a theme to which this Article returns in discussion of
3
Eldridge and Agins.1
6. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1978).
7. 23 Cal. 3d 605, 591 P.2d 514 (1979).
8. For a discussion of the court of appeal cases since Agins see notes 71-85 & accompanying text infra.
9. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
10. 116 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1974), rev'd, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365
(1975).
11. Id at444.
12. d at 445 (Fleming, J., dissenting).
13. For a discussion of the proper remedy in down-zoning actions, see Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 23 Cal. 3d 605, 591 P.2d 514 (1979), discussed notes 57-60 & accompanying text
infra, disapproving Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1976), discussed note 46 & accompanying text infra.
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The California Supreme Court overturned the court of appeal and
reinstated the trial court's ruling.14 The court rejected plaintiffs' allegation that they had been deprived of any "reasonably beneficial use" of
their land "commensurate with its value"-the remaining value of
$80,000 proved the land was not useless. Under federal and California
precedent, the court observed, an allegation of mere diminution in
value, even an eighty percent reduction, does not suffice to state a cause
of action for inverse condemnation.' 5 Indeed, the court noted that in
the leading case establishing civic authority to zone property under the
police power, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,16 the United States Supreme
Court sustained the ordinance despite allegation of a seventy-five percent reduction in value.
Justice Clark in his dissent in HFH maintained that the "taking or
damaged" language of Article I, section 19 of the California Constitution required compensation whenever, because of down-zoning, land
"has (1) suffered substantial decrease in value, (2) the decrease is of
would incur
long or potentially infinite duration and (3) the ' owner
7
burden."'
financial
the
of
share
fair
his
than
more
The majority rejected Justice Clark's formula for determining
when to award damages for inverse condemnation. The majority's reasoning rests largely on the zoning-dependent value of real property. In
recent years there has been a phenomenal increase in the value of unimproved land in urban regions of California,' 8 an increase attributable to the combined effects of inflation, immigration, and a growing
scarcity of undeveloped property. To realize this increase in value by
developing the land, the owner must obtain favorable zoning. When
the municipal government grants a favorable change, it creates an instant windfall to the owner.19
Occasionally a municipality may go too far in granting favorable
zoning and decide that the public good requires it to down-zone property. In so doing, the government is destroying only a "paper value"
which its prior decision created, and often simply restores the zoning
which neighboring property already has. In view of the present fiscal
14. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
15. Id at 514, 542 P.2d at 241, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
16. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
17. 15 Cal. 3d at 526, 542 P.2d at 250, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (Clark, J., dissenting).
18. See generally Hagman, 4 New Deal Trading Windfallsfor Wo4eouts, 40 PLANNING
9 (1974).
19. Id. See also Costonis, Development Rights Transfer.- An Exploratory Essay, 83
YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Rose, A Proposalforthe SeparationandMarketability ofDevelopment
Rights as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 635 (1974).

September 19791

CALIFORNIA ZONING LAW

restraints upon municipal governments in California, recognition of a
right to inverse condemnation damages in a case such as HFH could
lock a community into zoning decisions which later events might prove
to be imprudent.
The principal objection to the foregoing reasoning is that the owner may have relied on the higher zoning classification when purchasing
the property at an inflated price. Yet, as the majority in HFH points
out, the rule is well settled that landowners have no vested right in
existing or anticipated zoning; the purchaser of property with favorable
zoning should be aware of that rule and discount the purchase price for
the property accordingly. Thus, the majority concludes that the purchaser is, in effect, a speculator who wagers that the property will retain
20
its present zoning, and cannot claim unfairness if the wager is lost.
The HFH decision brings to attention the philosophical conflict
which underlies this area of the law. Zoning restrictions, enacted pursuant to the police power, rest on the fundamental proposition that the
state must be able to regulate land use to promote the general welfare.
The principle that landowners have no vested right in existing zoning
serves to avoid constraints that would deny government the flexibility
necessary to this use of the police power. Most regulation 6f land use
deprives some persons of valuable economic opportunities, but government could not function if it could not regulate under the police power
without compensating all persons who suffer economic harm from that
2
regulation. '
Very different theories underlie the constitutional requirement for
payment of just compensation. The primary basis for the requirement
is the equitable principle that an individual should not be required to
bear a disproportionate burden of the cost of public improvements or
regulations. 22 The constitutional requirement of just compensation
20. 15 Cal. 3d at 521, 542 P.2d at 246, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374. See Michelman, Property,
Utiliy, andFairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1238 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Michelman]. See also Berger, A Policy
Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 165, 195-96 (1974).
21. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Bacich v. Board of Control, 23
Cal. 2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943). See Van Alstyne, Taking or Damagingby Police
Power: The SearchforInverse Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1971). But
c/.Michelman, supranote 20, at 1181 ("[Aluy measure which society cannot afford or... is
unwilling to finance under conditions of full compensation, society cannot afford at all").
22. Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943); see Sax,
Takings, PrivatePropery andPublicRights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 177 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Sax]. For a discussion of the theories underlying the constitutional requirement for payment of just compensation see E. FREuND, THE POLICE POWER 546-47 (1904); Dunham, .4
Legal and Economic Basisfor City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 663-69 (1958);
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thus serves "to distribute throughout the community the loss inflicted
23
upon the individual.
The conflict between these contending policies, unfortunately, is
not confined to unusual cases. To the contrary, a substantial percentage of land use regulations enacted by modern governments impose a
burden which falls disproportionately upon a small portion of the community. Undiluted assertion of the principles underlying the police
power in these cases, however, would vitiate the owner's right to just
compensation. 24 On the other hand, undiluted assertion of the principles of just compensation would limit the police power to those few
measures which bear equally upon all members of the community. 25 A
compromise is essential. That compromise cannot be derived from
analysis of the fundamental principles, but rather must be found in a
political accommodation of competing values.
One possible compromise is that presented by Justice Clark's dissent in HFH, under which the right to compensation would depend
largely on the substantiality of the loss and the duration of the restriction resulting from the change in zoning, rather than the severity of
present use restrictions. 26 The validity of Justice Clark's theory would
seem to turn upon whether the owner justifiably relied on the prior
higher zoning. Indeed, the question of whether an owner of undevelMichelman, supra note 20; 91

HARV.

L.

REV.

1427, 1466-86 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Zon-

ing Developments].

23. Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943).
24. In recent years proponents of compensation for down-zoning have received further
support from economic cost/benefit analysis. See generally E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER
546-47 (1904); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J.
75 (1973); Dunham, A Legal andEconomic Basisfor City Planning,58 COLUM. L. REV. 651,
663-69 (1958); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86

L.J. 385 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Ellickson]; Michelman, supra note 20; Zoning
Developments, supra note 22, at 1486-1500, 1586-90. By requiring compensation for private
loss, the theoreticians point out, courts compel the legislature to take account of such loss
and thus deter enactment of economically inefficient programs. Id.
25. In many cases, if the government were compelled to take account of the private loss
by compensating owners, it would not enact the programs, although that result may stem
less from appreciation of the inefficiency of the program than from lack of money to carry it
out.
26. The dissenting opinion urged compensation "when by public action land has (1)
suffered substantial decrease in value, (2) the decrease is of long or potentially infinite duration and (3) the owner would incur more than his fair share of the financial burden." 15 Cal.
3d at 526, 542 P.2d at 250, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 378. This theory appears to distinguish between
down-zoning and refusal to upzone property. In contrast, most other theories would reach
the same result in cases of restrictive zoning regardless of how the property was previously
zoned. See generally Ellickson, supra note 24; Michelman, supra note 20; Sax, supra note 22;
YALE

Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power. The Searchfor Inverse Condemnation
Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971).
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oped land can justifiably rely on present zoning may be the principal
difference of opinion between Justice Clark and the HFH majority.
Three other compromises balancing the police power of the state
against the landowners' right to just compensation have attained notoriety in the legal literature. One is the proposal of Professor
Michelman, under which a zoning restriction requires compensation if
it fails to meet either of two standards---"efficiency" and "horizontal
equity."2 7 Efficiency refers to cost/benefit analysis; a regulation is economically efficient if its benefits exceed its costs. 2 8 The Michelman test

for horizontal equity states that requiring a person to bear a loss is fair
if that person should be able to perceive that a general policy of refusis likely to promote
ing compensation to persons in the same situation
29
run.
long
the
in
persons
the welfare of such
No court has adopted the Michelman proposal, although it would
be an interesting experiment. Cost/benefit ratios presumably could be
derived with the aid of expert economic evidence, but one wonders
what evidence would be admissible to prove that an enlightened owner
would realize that persons like himself would benefit in the long run
from a policy of refusing compensation.
Another proposal, that of Professor Costonis, advocates compensation based not on market value, but on the value of the most restrictive reasonable beneficial use.30 Costonis suggests that when
compensation is awarded the state should be granted the right to develop the property,3 ' which right could be traded in a market for transferable development rights.32 The Costonis proposal is somewhat more
27. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1173-76. Cf.Ellickson, supra note 24, at 414-15 (suggesting three principal goals for zoning ordinances: efficiency (cost/benefit analysis); horizontal equity (requiring the government to treat like persons alike); and vertical equity
(fairness of the distribution of wealth among different income groups)).
28. See Ellickson, supra note 24, at 419; Michelman, supra note 20, at 1214.
29. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1223; Ellickson, supra note 24, at 415.
30. See Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotesfor
the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies,75 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1021 (1975). For a summary of Costonis' theory, see Zoning Developments, supra note 22, at 1500-01.
31. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power. 4ntidotes/or the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies,75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1061-65 (1975).
32. The proposal for transferable development rights may solve two of the difficult
problems in inverse condemnation theory. The first is the problem of what interest the government acquires when it pays inverse condemnation damages of less than the value of the
fee, and what it can do with the rights so acquired. Under the Costonis approach, the government in HFH would have acquired a commercial development right which it could sell
to someone who wanted to develop some other property. As pointed out by Hagman and
Misczynski, absent a method for recapturing zoning caused increases in land value, government acquisition of an interest in land is essential to prevent the landowner from receiving a
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workable than Michelman's and has received the qualified endorse33
ment of the New York Court of Appeals.
Finally, we note the proposal of Hagman and Misczynski, 34 under
which landowners would receive partial compensation for losses attributable to regulatory action but would pay an equivalent percentage of
gains attributable to such action. The proposal envisions that legislatures instead of courts would take the leading part in enacting such a
plan; indeed it seems doubtful if windfall recapture, an essential part of
the plan, could be brought about by judicial decision alone.
A central question remains: whether any compromise position,
however desirable in the abstract, is constitutionally compelled. Perhaps within the broad area in which principles of police power and
inverse condemnation overlap courts should not impose specific formulas, but interpret the Constitution to give the legislature some freedom
to select the basis for accommodation. That body can better take account of the fiscal resources, or lack of resources, available to pay damage awards. If the constitutional threshold for damage awards is too
easily surpassed, inability to pay such awards in times of fiscal restraint
may imperil needed police power measures; when revenue is ample, the
state can then be more generous than the minimal constitutional requirements.
HFH specifies three circumstances under which regulation that
falls short of actual seizure of possession may give rise to a cause of
action for inverse condemnation. The first, exemplified by Klopping P.
City of JWhittier35 and Peacock v. County of Sacramento,36 is the case of
inequitable precondemnation activities.
In Klopping the condemning agency made a formal announcement
that it intended to condemn plaintiffs land. It then unreasonably
delayed commencement of eminent domain proceedings, which resulted in a decline in the market value of plaintiffs property. The court
held that the condemnee was entitled to compensation for precondouble recovery if the restrictions were later removed. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI,
WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS (1979).
The second is the problem which arises when numerous properties are suitable for development, but public policy or market forces dictate that only one such property be developed. Rather than let one owner receive a windfall, while the others sue for inverse
condemnation, Costonis would assign each partial development rights, and permit development to the party who buys up a sufficient number of such rights.
33. Fred F. French Inv. Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381,
385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
34. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS (1979).
35. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
36. 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969).
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demnation losses from the diminution in market value of the property

action of the condemning agency
attributed to unreasonable or unfair
37
prior to formal condemnation.
Similarly, in Peacock the county enacted a zoning ordinance pur-

suant to a publicly announced intention of acquiring land for an airport. The zoning ordinance as "applied to plaintiffs' lands ...
deprived [them] of any practical, substantial or beneficial use

thereof"' 38 for a period of five years, after which the county renounced
its intention to acquire the land.

The court found that the

"[e]xceptional and extraordinary circumstances" enumerated consti39
tuted a taking of plaintiffs' property.

Recent decisions, however, have placed two practical limitations

on the doctrine of inequitable precondemnation activities. First, even
though the political steps leading to a decision to condemn property
may paralyze the landowner's ability to develop the land, the courts
have declared that such steps cannot constitute an inverse condemnation.40 To hold otherwise would require a public entity to debate condenation matters in secret lest the debate itself constitute a taking.

Second, when a public entity embarks on a large scale project such as a
freeway, it may condemn only a portion of the needed properties each
year. Inevitably, the value of other properties on the freeway route will
be depressed. Yet to hold that the designation of the route and the
initiation of the purchase program constituted inverse condemnation

would force the condemning agency to budget the entire purchase program for the initial year, which might render the project fiscally unsound. Recognizing this danger, the state supreme court, in Jones v.

People,41 stated in dictum that route designation and commencement
of a purchase program did not constitute a taking of the remaining
42
properties destined for acquisition.

37. 8 Cal. 3d at 52, 500 P.2d at 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
38. 271 Cal. App. 2d at 854, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
39. Id
40. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 23 Cal.3d 605, 613, 591 P.2d 514, 521 (1979); Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal. App. 3d 667, 678, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687, 694 (1978); City of
Walnut Creek v. Leadership Hous. Sys., Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 611, 622-23, 140 Cal. Rptr.
690, 696 (1977).
41. 22 Cal. 3d 144, 583 P.2d 165, 148 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1978).
42. Id at 152, 583 P.2d at 170, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
In Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 151 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1979), decided after Jones, the
court of appeal ruled that, even without a formal intent to condemn, the city's refusals to
rezone plaintiff's property for resort hotel use, its actions looking to acquisition of the property, and other activities "intended to freeze or lower the value of the property," amounted
to the type of harsh and oppressive conduct which would entitle plaintiff to relief. 151 Cal.
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The second circumstance which gives rise to a cause of action for
inverse condemnation is the use of a zoning ordinance by a public
agency to evade the requirement of acquisition and payment when the
property is actually used for a public purpose. In Sneed v. County of
Riverside,43 the leading California case exemplifying this form of condemnation, the court viewed the county's restrictions on Sneed's use of
his property as the equivalent of a public taking of an air navigation
easement over the land and concluded that his complaint stated a cause
of action in inverse condemnation. 44
In a footnote to the HFH opinion, the supreme court suggested a
third possible factual setting for an action in inverse condemnation,
stating that "[t]his case [HFI] does not present, and we therefore do
not decide, the question of entitlement to compensation in the event a
zoning regulation forbade substantially all use of the land in question.
We leave the question for another day."' 4 5 This footnote raised two
related questions which became the focus of subsequent litigation. The
first was a question of the appropriate remedy: should the landowner
seek invalidation of the ordinance, damages for inverse condemnation,
or both? The second was a question of substantive law, although it
arose most often as an issue of pleading: what must the landowner
allege and prove to sustain a cause of action on the theory that the
zoning "forbade substantially all use" of the property?
Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto
When HFH was filed, these very questions were pending before
the supreme court on a petition for hearing in Eldridge v. City of Palo
Alto .46 The city had annexed 600 acres of largely undeveloped foothill
land in 1968, zoned it for one-acre residential lots, and commenced a
study of the property which eventually led to its rezoning as "open
space." The later zoning permitted only one dwelling per ten acres and
provided for public access via paths and trails.4 7 In an opinion pubRptr. at 923. The state supreme court granted a hearing, and sent the case back to the court
of appeal for reconsideration in light of Agins. The appellate court decision thus has been
vacated. California Supreme Court Minutes, May 17, 1979.
43. 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
44. Id at 212, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
45. 15 Cal. 3d at 518 n.16, 543 P.2d at 245, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
46. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
47. Two other actions arising from Palo Alto's open space zoning were filed in federal
court. In Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974), the court ruled that
the landowner's complaint stated grounds for an action in inverse condemnation. Subsequently, in Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
the court found that the zoning was not a "bona fide attempt to impose limitations of the use
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lished shortly before HFH, the court of appeal overturned the city's
demurrer to a cause of action for inverse condemnation on the ground
that whether a zoning restriction is so burdensome as to constitute a
taking is a question of fact-not to be decided by demurrer but rather
by a trial on the issue 4 8 Justices Sims, dissenting, argued that the owner's only remedy lay in an attack on the validity of the ordinance. By
stipulating to its validity, plaintiffs, he claimed, had stipulated them49
selves out of court.
The supreme court granted a hearing in Eldridge and remanded
the case to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of HFH. On
remand, the court of appeal consolidated the case with a similar suit,
Beyer v. City of Palo Alto, 50 which was filed by a neighboring landowner. The court of appeal, noting that HFHleft the issue of the appropriate remedy open, reaffirmed its view that excessively restrictive
51
zoning can constitute a taking and support an action for damages.
Justice Sims dissented as to that point with respect to Eldridge on the
grounds he had urged earlier.5 2
Unlike the plaintiffs in Eldridge, however, the Beyer plaintiffs had
not stipulated to the validity of the zoning, but sought as alternative
relief a declaration that the ordinance was invalid. Turning, therefore,
for the first time, to the issue of the constitutional validity of the ordinance, the court held the ordinance constitutional on the ground that it
reasonably related to the legitimate civic goal of preserving open space
and protecting the environment.5 3 Justice Sims again dissented, maintaining that Beyer's conveyance of the property subsequent to trial rendered plaintiffs' action moot in so far as it sought invalidation of the
zoning.5 4 The supreme court denied the petition for hearing from the
second Eldridge decision by a 4-3 vote.55
of the property of the plaintiff, but rather the final step in a program designed to acquire
rights over the property for the enjoyment and use of the public in general," and awarded
damages for inverse condemnation. Id. at 978-79. .4rastrawas later vacated pursuant to a
settlement agreement. 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
48. The original appellate decision in the Eldridge case, appearing at 124 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1975), was omitted from the official reports because hearing was granted by the California
Supreme Court.
dissenting).
49. Id at 558 (Sims, J.,
50. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
51. Id. at 633, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
dissenting). See text accompanying
52. Id at 638-39, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 590-91 (Sims, J.,
note 49 supra.
53. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 631, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
54. Id at 653-55, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02 (Sims, J.,dissenting).
55. Id at 655, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
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Eldridge addressed the questions left open by HFH. First, it answered the question of remedy: a landowner, aggrieved by an ordinance which deprived him or her of substantially all use of his or her
property, may seek damages in an action for inverse condemnation instead of suing to invalidate the ordinance.5 6 Second, although the Eldridge opinion was unclear as to precisely what allegations were
essential to support a cause of action in inverse condemnation, it necessarily held by implication that the allegations of lack of reasonable use
tendered by Eldridge and Beyer were sufficient.
Agins v. City of Tiburon
The problem of the remedy for unconstitutionally restrictive zona definitive answer in Agins v. City of Tiburon. 7 The city
received
ing
zoned plaintiffs' five acres for single family dwellings with a maximum
density of one dwelling per acre.58 Asserting that the zoning ordinance
completely destroyed the value of their land, plaintiffs sued for inverse
condemnation. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to
amend.
The supreme court, affirming the decision below, made its position
concerning the choice of remedy clear:
[A] landowner alleging that a zoning ordinance has deprived him of
substantially all use of his land may attempt ... to invalidate the
ordinance as excessive regulation .... He may not, however, elect
to sue in inverse condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive
use of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation
v.
in eminent domain must be paid .... To the extent that Eldridge
59
City of Palo Alto . . . is contrary, it is expressly disapproved.
56. Id. at 621, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 579. Cf Pan American Properties v. City of Santa
Cruz, 81 Cal. App. 3d 244, 254, 146 Cal. Rptr. 428, 434 (1978) (interpreting Eldridge as

standing for the proposition that "public entities may not use their zoning power as a subterfuge to take land for public purposes without the payment of just compensation"). But see
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 23 Cal. 3d 605, 591 P.2d 514 (1979), disapproving Eldridgeon this
point. See also Note, Eldridge v. City of PaloA/to; Aberration or New Directionin Land Use
Law?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1572 (1977).
57. 23 Cal. 3d 605, 591 P.2d 514 (1979).

58. Under the City of Tiburon's zoning, plaintiffs could build a maximum of five units
or a minimum of one unit on their property, depending upon the architectural design and
the environmental impact. Id at 610, 591 P.2d at 516.
59.

Id at 612, 591 P.2d at 518. The Agins-defined remedy was reaffirmed in Furey v.

City of Sacramento, 24 Cal. 3d 862 (1979). In this very recent supreme court case, plaintiffs
owned land in the Natomas area of Sacramento County which was zoned agricultural. The
county authorized the sanitation district to lay large sewer trunk lines and to build a sewage
treatment plant to accommodate planned future residential and commercial growth. A total

of $3,137,462.86 was assessed against plaintiffs' property for the sewer facilities. Subsequent
to the enactment of state legislation designed to preserve open-space lands, however, the city
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The court rejected the action for inverse condemnation on the

ground that it would hamper local flexibility in land use planning and
regulation. The establishment of community plans would be deterred
if too specific a plan rendered the community liable for damages. Similarly, the exercise of police power would be inhibited if innovative

measures might lead to unexpected liability. 60 In light of the fiscal

economies experienced in many California communities following the
enactment of Proposition 1361 in 1978, communities now must plan
their budgets with special care and calculate their ability to acquire
land by eminent domain with a recognition that they probably cannot
raise taxes to finance the purchase. 62 An unexpected inverse condemnation award could demolish all prior careful planning. To pay for an
award, the community might have to cut expenditures for services or
for acquisition of other land which it considers to have higher priority.
If a zoning classification covering a large area were held unconstitutional, as happened in Eldridge,6 3 the award might be so sizable that
the city could neither pay it out of current revenues nor raise taxes to
meet the debt. Under these circumstances, prudent community leaders
could not take the risk that an ordinance would be found to be a taking
amended its general plan, providing for an open-space element. A zoning ordinance also
was adopted, prohibiting any change of plaintiffs' property from its agricultural classification and prohibiting any special use inconsistent with the open-space designation in the plan
for a substantial period of time.
Plaintiffs brought an action alleging that the combined effect of the open-space element
of the general plan and the open-space ordinance was inverse condemnation of their property, including the sewer facilities. Alternatively, plaintiffs asserted that defendants' prior
activities, including a general plan looking toward residential and commercial development
and the installation of sewer facilities, estopped the city from designating plaintiffs' property
as open-space.
Citing Agins, the decision noted that an "aggrieved landowner is limited to showing,
through an action for declaratory relief or mandate, that the legislation or regulation in
question, viewed either on its face or as applied, is an invalid exercise of police power
.... " Id. at 871-72. Such invalid exercise can only be shown, however, if the landowner is
deprived of substantially all reasonable use of his or her property. The continued availability of plaintifis land for use as agricultural land was found to be reasonable.
Although plaintiffs in Fureywere denied relief under a down-zoning theory, relief was
available in the form of an equitable reassessment-apparently a refund to the extent plaintiffs did not realize the benefits of the original assessment. Id at 877-78.
60. 23 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 591 P.2d at 519.
61. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A (West Supp. 1979). Section 1 of this article limits real
property taxes to one percent of full cash value, a limit far below the prior prevailing tax
rate.
62. Cities and counties can increase taxes only by a two-thirds vote of the qualified
electors. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 4 (West Supp. 1979).
63. See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra.
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and the "chilling effect" cited by the court in Agins 64 would be a realis65
tic danger.
Because inverse condemnation is a matter of constitutional law,
the question arises whether the new California approach is consistent
with federal constitutional principles. The authors contend that the
California court's rejection of the inverse condemnation remedy is constitutional. 66 Agins holds in effect that any zoning which under constitutional standards constitutes a taking of property is, for that reason, an
act in excess of the police power and hence invalid. If the public entity
still wants to impose the restriction, it can do so directly by deliberate
use of the eminent domain power. So long as the state affords the owner an adequate opportunity to remove the restriction from his or her
property, we conclude that no taking compensable under the Fourteenth Amendment has occurred.
There is one practical problem with limiting the landowner to a
suit to invalidate the restrictive zoning. A community determined to
prevent development could resort to a protracted series of delaying tactics. If ten acre zoning was held invalid, the locality could enact a new
nine and one-half acre law, and so on almost indefinitely. The courts
of Pennsylvania previously have encountered this problem of community intransigence. After observing the success of delaying tactics in
subverting court decisions, the courts countered by issuing judgments
which did not merely strike down a zoning classification but mandated
the issuance of the permits needed by the landowner to construct the
project. 67 But that remedy may be an overreaction. The fact that a
particular zoning measure is invalid should not entitle the landowner to
build without restraint; perhaps the city cannot enforce ten acre zoning
but surely it could still ban commercial uses or high rise apartments on
the property.
64.

23 Cal. 3d at 614, 591 P.2d at 519.

65. Hagman and Misczynski propose a program in which the government pays partial
compensation for loss in land value caused by zoning but recaptures a portion of any increase in land value attributable to zoning. Such a program, by providing additional revenue set aside for compensatory payments, would make possible redress for losses impossible
in the present fiscal setting. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS
(1978).
66. We argue that the Agins holding is constitutional, not that it represents the most
equitable solution to the problem. As Hagman and Misczynski point out, most of the argu-

ments which proved persuasive to the Agins court are objections to judicial action which
converts intended regulatory measures into takings as a matter of constitutional law. An
equitable statute which took into account gains as well as losses attributable to regulation
could overcome these objections. Id at 292, 303.
67. See D. MOSKOWITz, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 215-19 (1977).
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An alternative method of preventing delaying tactics would be for
the court not only to declare the restrictive zoning invalid, but also to
guide future zoning by declaring the maximum restrictive zoning which
can constitutionally be applied to the land in question. 68 That alternative, however, substantially increases the burden on the trial court. In
many cases merely determining whether a particular ordinance lies beyond the line separating reasonable zoning regulations from that which
unconstitutionally denies the owner substantially all use of land is difficult enough. Drawing that line with such precision that both the public
entity and landowner will know precisely what regulation will be upheld in future cases is far more difficult.
If neither the Pennsylvania solution of mandating issuance of all
needed permits, nor the foregoing proposal to determine the maximum
permissible restriction is acceptable, then the least the trial court can do
is to retain jurisdiction over the action until it can evaluate the public
entity's response to its decision. If the entity enacts a new law which
appears to be a palpable evasion of the court's ruling, the landowner
could bring the matter to the court's attention more speedily and efficiently than if filing a new action were necessary. Continued delaying
tactics by the community eventually would require more drastic court
action.
Agins did not provide a definite answer to the second question left
open by HFH when will an ordinance be said to deprive the landowner of substantially all use such that it is an unconstitutional act in
excess of the police power? The Agins decision touched on that issue
only briefly, holding that conclusory allegations that the ordinance has
destroyed completely the value of plaintiffs' property-when the ordinance on its face clearly permits residential development on that property-are insufficient to state a cause of action for inverse
condemnation.6 9
The Eldridge decisions had held a ten acre zoning law with provisions for public access to the property constitutional under the due
process clause, but nonetheless a taking requiring compensation in an
68. See Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Anildotesfor
the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021, 1049-55 (1975).
Costonis favors damage awards in inverse condemnation as a remedy for overly restrictive
zoning, but would base such awards not on the market value of the land prior to the zoning,
but on the most restrictive reasonable beneficial use of the land. Thus his theory would
require the court to determine also the maximum severity of restrictions constitutionally
permissible for each property.
69. 23 Cal. 3d at 616, 591 P.2d at 520.
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action for inverse condemnation. 70 Since Agins struck down the latter
holding, the correctness of the former also falls into question. If an
action to invalidate the zoning is the landowner's only remedy, the
court might be less willing to hold that the zoning complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, neither Agins nor Eldridge offers clear
guidance as to when a restrictive ordinance becomes so oppressive that
it will be held invalid. In the three years since the Eldridge decision,
however, a number of other court of appeal opinions have addressed
the issue.
Court of Appeal Decisions Subsequent to Eldridge
In the first decision, Pinheiro v. County ofMarin,7' the landowners
alleged damage caused by rezoning, but failed to allege the lack of any
remaining reasonable use. 72 The court held that absent allegations of
inequitable precondemnation activities, actual public use, or the elimination of any remaining reasonable use, the complaint failed to state a
73
cause of action.
The next decision, Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,74 involved a land use ordinance of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency which rezoned plaintiffs' land from industrial and commercial classification to "general forest." The court noted that
although plaintiffs had alleged deprivation of all reasonable use, their
pleadings conceded a remaining value of approximately twenty-five
percent of the prior value, thus demonstrating that some substantial use
of the property remained. 75 Under the circumstances, the court of appeal found HFH controlling: "[M]ere diminution in value of property
due to the rezoning of that property for less intensive uses does not give
rise to an action in inverse condemnation. ' 76 The Sierra Terreno court
70.

See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra.

71.

60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).

72. In fact, plaintiffs admitted on the face of their complaint that the land had a fair
market value of $210,000 subsequent to the zoning reclassification. Id at 325, 131 Cal. Rptr.
at 634.
73. Id at 328-29, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 636-37.
74. 79 Cal. App. 3d 439, 144 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1497 (1979).
75. Id at 443, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 777. The opinion does not state what uses were permitted within the "general forest" classification.
76. Id at 442, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 777. The court also concluded that the mere adoption
of a general plan designating areas for acquisition cannot give rise to a claim for inverse
condemnation, and that a party has no vested interest in a previous zoning classification. Id
See Jones v. People, 22 Cal. 3d 144, 583 P.2d 165, 148 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1978); Selby Realty
Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973). In
SierraTerreno, plaintiffs failed to allege that any existing use of their land had been terminated by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.
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thus reiterated the holding in previous cases, stressing that it is the legislature which must resolve the present "perplexing problem of eco-

nomic gain and loss" 77 created by zoning and rezoning. Finally, the
court emphasized that only within the limits set by HFll will the judifrom improper governciary exercise its "duty to protect the individual
'78
mental taking of or damage to property.

In Pan Pac#7c Properties,Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz 79 plaintiffs
challenged the validity of an ordinance zoning their property agricultural with one-acre minimum building sites. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the ordinance was invalid as applied to their land or, if
valid, that such zoning amounted to a taking of property without just
compensation by depriving them of all reasonable and beneficial uses
of their property. The court, however, failed to reach the merits of the

on the validity of the ordinance for a variety of proceplaintiffs' attack
80
dural reasons.
In addressing plaintiffs' inverse condemnation allegation, the court
distinguished Eldridge, interpreting the case to stand for the proposition that "public entities may not use their zoning power as a subterfuge to take land for public purposes without payment of just
compensation."' s No factual allegation in Pan Pacic demonstrated
that the zoning ordinance in question was a device to acquire property
instead of a regulation of the use of land. Mere conclusory allegations
of the absence of reasonable or beneficial use, the court therefore con-

cluded, were2 insufficient to support a cause of action for inverse con8
demnation.
The rule set out in HFH was again found to be controlling in
77. 79 Cal. App. 3d at 443, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
78. Id
79. 81 Cal. App. 3d 244, 146 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1978).
80. First, the court held that in not seeking a variance from the ordinance plaintiffs had
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, thus foreclosing any attack upon the substantive validity of the ordinance. .d at 249, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 431. This case was distinguishable from Eldridgeand Sneed where such application clearly would have been futile.
Id at 250, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 432. In fact, the ordinance rezoning the plaintiffs' property in
this case had always been interpreted as permitting single family residences on one-acre
minimum building sites. Thus, from all indications, the county probably would have
granted plaintiffs a variance had one been applied for. Id at 251, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
Second, the court determined that the county's thirty day statute of limitations barred the
action. Finally, the court held that an action to challenge either the validity of an allegedly
discriminatory zoning ordinance or its consistency with the county's general plan must be
brought by writ of mandamus and not by a claim of inverse condemnation. Id.at 251, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 433-34.
81. Id at 254, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
82. I1d at 254-55, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
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Friedman v. City of Fairfax.8 3 The case focused upon two competing
interests in regulating the use of land: the interest of a city in preserving open-space land through the exercise of its police power, balanced
against the individual's interest in maximizing the profitable use of private property.
As early as 1964, the city had expressed interest in acquiring plaintiff's property, a registered historical landmark, for preservation as a
public park. In 1973, the city down-zoned plaintiffs land to private
commercial recreational use. Although the change conformed with its
then current use, plaintiff alleged that the action diminished the market
value of the property by eighty percent. Plaintiff brought suit, seeking
damages in inverse condemnation and a declaration of the invalidity of
the ordinance. Plaintiff attacked the ordinance as inconsistent with the
general plan and as improper "spot zoning."
The court of appeal reversed the judgment of the trial court, rejecting the lower court's finding of arbitrary and unlawful spot zoning:
Absent evidence of inequitable precondemnation activities, denial of
any reasonably beneficial use, or public use, the proof considered by
the court disclosed nothing more than a diminution in market value
due to down zoning for which a cause of action in inverse condemnaon such
tion will not lie. . . and
84 a judgment awarding compensation
theory may not stand.
Moreover, the appellate court concluded that while the open-space ordinance may confer a public benefit, "such an otherwise valid purpose
and attendant result is not the equivalent of a public use requiring
compensation. So long as a rational basis exists for a zoning decision,
the purpose or motive of the organizing body becomes irrelevant to any
85
inquiry into its reasonableness.
A Summary of Current California Law on Down-Zoning
From HFH,Agins, and the court of appeal cases we can draw
some conclusions about the shape of California law on down-zoning.
First, as a matter of substantive law, the landowner has a cause of action only if the zoning deprives the landowner of substantially all use
of the property. The courts take this proposition literally: the landowner may suffer considerable loss if land is down-zoned from commercial to multiple unit residential, from multiple unit to single unit
83.
84.
85.

81 Cal. App. 3d 667, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1978).
Id at 679, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (citations omitted).
Id at 677, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 694 (emphasis by the court).
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residential, or from residential to agricultural, but as long as a substantial use remains, no cause of action arises.

Second, as a matter of pleading, conclusory allegations that the
down-zoning results in no substantial remaining use often will not suffice. The court will take judicial notice of the ordinance and, if it per-

mits a substantial use, reject the complaint. A landowner who wants to
claim that a use permitted by the zoning ordinance is not a substantial
or reasonable use would be well advised to explain the basis for this
claim in the pleadings. Allegations that the property retains substantial
value, unless that value is merely a speculative appraisal of the possibility that the restrictive zoning will be lifted, imply a substantial remaining use and may well be fatal to the complaint.
Third, as a matter of remedy, the landowner's only option, except
in.the unusual case of actual public use, is a suit to invalidate the restrictive zoning. In rejecting the remedy of damages for inverse condenmation, California courts have charted a unique course. Their

decisions, although resting on principles of fiscal policy and flexibility
in planning, put California at odds with some of the federal courts,
particularly the Northern District of California. 6 Consequently landowners are likely to file future inverse condemnation actions in federal
instead of state courts, thus forcing the federal courts to face the question of whether to follow HFHand Agins or to adhere to federal prece87
dents.
To explain the post-Agins California practice, consider how the
courts would now decide the case of Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto.8 8

The facts of that case might still support a cause of action for inverse
86. See Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal.
1975), vacatedpursuantto settlement, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976); M.J. Brock &
Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Dahi v. City of Palo Alto, 372
F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The Agins decision finds support, however, in the decisions
of some courts of other states. See Davis v. Pima County, 590 P.2d 459 (Ct. App. Ariz.
1978); Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 554 P.2d 317 (Colo. App. 1976); Fred
F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5
(1976).
87. A landowner could also file suit for compensation in state courts but state a cause
of action founded upon the federal civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). California
courts assert concurrent jurisdiction over suits under § 1983, Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d
518, 524, 531 P.2d 772, 775, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204, 207 (1975), and apparently an action for
inverse condemnation can be fitted within the framework of that statute. See Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 99 S. Ct. 1171 (1979). It is not at all clear
whether there are any substantive differences between federal constitutional law, federal
statutory law under § 1983, and California constitutional law as declared in Agins.
88. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976). See text accompanying notes 51-56
supra.
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condemnation based on either of two theories: that the cities engaged
in inequitable activities aimed at depressing the value of the land to
facilitate purchase of that land as a public park, or that by requiring
public access for hiking and riding trails, the city intended an actual
public use of the Eldridge property. The landowners could not, however, state a cause of action for damages on the theory that they had
been deprived of all substantial use of their land. If the ordinance had
that effect, it would exceed the city's authority under the police power
and therefore would be invalid. Thus, although in such a situation the
plaintiffs in Eldridge could not prevail on a claim for damages on a
theory of excessively restrictive zoning, they might well succeed in per89
suading a court to hold the ordinance unconstitutional.
The principal effect of the line of decisions from HFH through
Agins is to preclude inadvertent public liability for planning and zoning decisions. A public entity can decide what property it wishes to
acquire by eminent domain, and how it will restrict the use of property
retained in private ownership, without fear that courts will hold that
the entity has "taken" and must pay for property which it does not wish
to acquire. Although this freedom to regulate given the public entities
may be susceptible to abuse, 90 the greater danger at present lies in court
decisions that may devastate budgetary planning of local entities and
chill others from enacting effective land use ordinances. The California
decisions serve to overcome that danger.
Exclusionary Zoning
"Exclusionary zoning" typically refers to zoning intended to exclude persons unable to afford detached, single family residences on
large lots, although on occasion ordinances simply have excluded all
potential immigrants. All zoning, of course, excludes some uses, and
concern over exclusion of prospective residents arose slowly. In the
past, most communities favored residential development, so that earlier
cases often concerned the exclusion of commercial or industrial uses in
favor of residential use.
89.

One alternative to the Agins approach might be to permit a city, facing a judicial

determination that a regulation is invalid under the police power, to elect between paying
compensation or repealing the regulation. See MODEL LAND DEV. CODE, § 9-112(3) (1976).

We reject, however, the suggestion, raised upon petition for rehearing in Agins, that the
decision lacks needed flexibility because it does not offer the city an option of paying compensation. Under the Agins analysis, whenever a regulation is invalid under the police
power the city necessarily retains the right to accomplish its end by use of the eminent
domain power.
90.

See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
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When judicial concern began to center on zoning ordinances
which aimed at excluding new residents, two problems became apparent in the selection of a standard by which to measure the validity of
the ordinance. The first was the extent to which courts should defer to
the judgment of the legislative body. The issue centered on whether
the courts should uphold an ordinance whenever it bears some reasonable relationship to the general welfare. The second was the question
of "whose general welfare," the people of the enacting community, or
members of a larger, more amorphous community, had been affected
by the ordinance. Both problems stem from the fact that exclusionary
ordinances commonly are enacted by small municipalities in which
prospective immigrants have no representation and which, unless restrained by judicial doctrine, may pay little attention to the welfare of
those beyond their borders.
The Evolution of the Activist Approach
One of the earliest decisions to strike down a zoning ordinance as
exclusionary was the 1959 decision of the Virginia Supreme Court in
Boardof County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper.9' The undeveloped western region of the county was zoned agricultural, a classification which permitted one-half acre lots, when the board rezoned that
region to residential zoning on two acre lots. In holding the ordinance
invalid, the court noted plaintiffs' argument that the law was intended
to exclude persons who could not afford larger lots, but did not expressly endorse that contention. Instead, the court ventured that the
two year grace period in the ordinance, during which one-half acre development could continue, revealed that the supervisors did not really
believe two acre zoning was necessary. 92 The court, despite referring to
no evidence other than the economic history of land development in
the county, held that the evidence in the record sustained the finding of
the trial court that the ordinance93bore no reasonable or substantial relationship to the general welfare.
Six years later the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the
four acre zoning law of Eaton Township, a rural area at the margin of
Philadelphia suburban expansion.94 The township sought to justify the
law by claiming that substantial additional immigration into the township would create problems of sewage disposal and highway conges91.
92.
93.
94.

200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
id at 662, 107 S.E.2d at 396.
Id
National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

tion. It pointed also to the desire of its residents to preserve a rural life
style and to the value of providing suitable settings for historic
landmarks. The court rejected these arguments:
Zoning is a tool in the hands of governmental bodies which enables them to more effectively meet the demands of evolving and
growing communities. It must not and can not be used by those officials as an instrument by which they may shirk their responsibilities.
Zoning is a means by which a governmental body can plan
9 5 for the
future-it may not be used as a means to deny the future.
The basis asserted by the court-that zoning may not be used "to
deny the future"-seems at first to be an overstatement of the constitutional principles. Why cannot zoning be used "to deny the future?"
Government can ban cars from Mackinac Island, bar factories from
locating in regions of unpolluted air 96 and set aside vast regions as wilderness. 97 If development is the mark of the future, then at least in
selected areas and issues, the current and widely approved government
policy is to deny the future. Moreover, such a policy is not necessarily
inappropriate for Eaton Township. Rational arguments can be
presented that the migration of the middle class into the suburbs is
harmful to the general welfare: it places heavy fiscal burdens on the
suburbs while eroding the fiscal base of the cities; it results in schools
and neighborhoods segregated by race and wealth; it creates traffic
jams, air pollution, and sewage disposal problems. 98 In the long run
Pennsylvania might be better off if Eaton and other townships around
Philadelphia retained their rural character and the city retained its
middle class residents.
Furthermore, even if we conclude that, in general, the region
around Philadelphia should accommodate suburban growth, wise policy may make exceptions for regions of special scenic or historical significance. Should Eaton Township be such an exception? If the
township, through its elected representatives, claims it should be an exception, on what basis can the court find its claim unreasonable?
95.

Id at 527-28, 215 A.2d at 610.

96. National Environment Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1979).
97. Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131-1136 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979).
98. See generally Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557
P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); In re Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653,
107 S.E.2d 390 (1959); Clark & Grable, Growth Control in California: Prospectsfor Local
Government Implementation of Timing and Sequential Control of ResidentialDevelopment, 5
PAC.

L.J. 570 (1974); Ellickson, supra note 24.
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The answer of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was that the
township itself is not competent to decide such matters. In the case of
In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.,99 the court, striking down a two and three
acre zoning law of Concord Township, stated that
if Concord Township is successful in unnaturally limiting its population growth through the use of exclusive zoning regulations, the people who would normally live there will inevitably have to live in
another community, and the requirementthat they do so isnot a decision that Concord Township should alone be able to make. 100
Kit-Mar's assertion that local government is not competent to
adopt exclusionary policies presents conceptual problems. The holding
of the court was that the ordinance exceeded the constitutional limits of
the police power, a holding which does not differentiate between local,
regional, and statewide legislative acts. The language of the decision,
however, implies that if a metropolitan regional body or the state itself
had zoned Concord Township for two and three acre lots, that law
would receive more favorable review than the identical decision by the
township.' 0 1 Yet the landowner's constitutional rights ordinarily would
not depend upon which level of government invaded those rights. A
law which exceeded the scope of the police power when enacted by the
township would not become legitimate when enacted by a group of
townships, or by the state itself.
A footnote in Kit-Mar pointed to an escape from this dilemma. So
long as the court's focus is limited to the alleged abridgment of the
property rights of the landowner, no distinction can be drawn between
restrictions enacted by local bodies and those of regional or statewide
bodies. The Kit-Mar court noted, however, that although prior cases
have posed the issue "as involving the constitutional due process rights
of the land-owner whose property has been zoned adversely to his best
interests, it cannot realistically be detached from the rights of other
people desirous of moving into the area 'in search of a comfortable
place to live.' "102
Solving the dilemma, then, requires a practical constitutional test
which accounts for the rights of prospective immigrants to the municipality in question. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Southern Bur03 undertook to
lington County NAACP v. Townshio of Mount Laurel,1
resolve that problem by severing the issue of exclusionary zoning from
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
Id at 474-75, 268 A.2d at 769 (emphasis added).
Id at 476, 268 A.2d at 769.
Id at 474 n.6, 268 A.2d at 768.
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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its anchor in private property rights and resting its decision on the effect of exclusionary zoning on the general welfare. The township of
Mount Laurel zoned its undeveloped land for light industry and single
family housing on half-acre lots. Compared to the two to four acre
zoning held invalid in Pennsylvania cases,'0 4 and the one acre zoning
upheld in Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills,0 5 the Mount Laurel ordinance seems relatively moderate. 10 6 The ordinance faced review, however, by a court which had decided upon a radical new
07
judicial intervention into zoning law.'
The New Jersey court recognized the well settled principles that
laws are presumed constitutional, that one attacking the validity of a
law bears the burden of proof, and that ordinarily courts accord great
deference to the determination of the legislative body that the enactment will promote the general welfare. 0 8 It declined, however, to follow those traditional principles. Reversing the usual presumption of
constitutionality, the court ruled that a township's zoning ordinance
was presumptively invalid unless it provided a reasonable opportunity
for an appropriate variety and choice of housing, including housing for
persons of low and moderate income. 0 9 To comply with this standard,
the municipal zoning ordinance "must permit multi-family housing,
without bedroom or similar restrictions, as well as small dwellings on
very small lots, low cost housing of other types and, in general, high
0
density zoning."1
The township attempted to defend its restrictive zoning on
grounds of fiscal frugality, arguing that low cost housing gives rise to
public costs in excess of tax revenues, and that its ordinance would thus
104. In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa.
466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965). See text accompanying notes 1-9 supra.
105. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974). See notes 122-28 & accompanying text infra for a
discussion of Ybarra.

106. Mount Laurel zoned approximately 30% of its area for light industry, slightly over
1%for retail stores, and the balance for single family residential development on mediumsized lots. Most of the undeveloped residential land was zoned for half-acre lots, but the
ordinance permitted cluster development and planned unit developments.
107. The court noted that it had plainly warned in past cases that it would change its

attitude of leniency toward municipal zoning restrictions when it concluded that changing
land use required such judicial action. 67 N.J. at 176-77, 336 A.2d at 726.
108. Id at 174-81, 336 A.2d at 725-28. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926); Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 2d 95, 222 P.2d 439 (1950);
Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949); Zoning Developments,
supra note 22, at 1443-62.
109. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
110. Id at 187, 336 A.2d at 732.
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result in lower property taxes."I The benefits cited by the township,
however, flowed only to its present residents, and the welfare of those
residents, the courts declared, does not define the constitutional test.
The relevant standard as defined by the court is not the welfare of the
enacting municipality, but the welfare of the region from which the
demand for housing arose. Measured by that standard, the Mount
Laurel ordinance failed to promote the general welfare and hence,
ruled the court, was invalid under both the state constitution and state
statutes authorizing townships to enact zoning laws to promote the general welfare.
The Mount Laurel decision puts forward some radical answers to
the two issues noted earlier: the extent of judicial deference to legislative judgment and the question of whose welfare provides the constitutional measure. On the first issue, the traditional view has been that
courts do not pass upon the desirability of legislation; even though the
judges may believe the act will do more harm than good, they must
defer to the legislative body unless the legislation lacks any reasonable
relationship to promotion of the general welfare. The federal constitutional standard, established in Village of Euclid, is that a zoning ordinance is invalid only if its "provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare."' 12 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions virtually have renounced judicial power to declare legislation invalid on the ground of substantive due process, regardless of its
apparent unreasonableness.' 1 3 Moreover, legislation attacked under
the due process clause enjoys a presumption of constitutionality; if its
validity "be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed
' 4
to control." "1
The New Jersey decision, however, affords the Mount Laurel ordinance no presumption of constitutionality. It evidences no deference to
legislative judgment, no willingness to resolve debatable questions in
favor of the ordinance. To the contrary, the court established a presumption that municipal ordinances which do not provide low and
Ill. Id at 185, 336 A.2d at 730-31.
112. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
113. See D. MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 82-88 (1977); Williams,
PlanningLaw and the Supreme Court (Pt. 1), 13 ZONING DIGEST 57, 61-62 (1961). See, e.g.,
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934); O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1931).
114. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
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moderate income housing opportunities "at least to the extent of the
municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional
need"1 5 are contrary to the general welfare. Further, this assertion by
the court of its power to invalidate laws with which it disagrees, was
necessary to the Mount Laurel decision because, as observed earlier,
reasonable arguments can be presented against development of metropolitan fringe areas. Thus, although the Mount Laurel decision arguably could be sustained on equal protection grounds because of the
wealth discrimination inherent in the township's ordinance, 16 it probably could not be sustained as a due process decision under the tradi117
tional standards calling for deference to legislative determinations.
The New Jersey court was equally explicit in its resolution of the
second issue. In determining whether an ordinance promotes the general welfare, the appropriate measure is the welfare not of the enacting
township but of the surrounding region. The court offered no confining
definition of the applicable region, stating that the size of the region
will "necessarily vary from situation to situation." 118 Rejecting the
suggestion that the "region" must be limited to a single county, the
115. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
116. A similar argument could have been made in National Land and Investment Co. v.
Kohn,419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). Four acre zoning in Eaton Township was constitutionally suspect not merely because it excluded but because it did not exclude impartially.
Those with money to buy four acre lots were welcome in Eaton Township, but all others
were barred. The court's opinion, however, made no mention of the problem of wealth
discrimination.
117. Addressing the question of judicial deference to legislative actions, the court in
Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976), stated: "If... a legitimate state interest is furthered
by the zoning regulation, we must defer to the legislative act. Being neither a super legislature nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal court is without authority to weigh and reappraise the factors considered or ignored by the legislative body in passing the challenged
zoning regulation." Id at 906 (citation omitted). See note 113 supra for Supreme Court
cases demonstrating judicial deference to legislative determinations. See also Zoning Developments, supra note 24.
"Traditionally, the power to establish land use policy has been exercised primarily by
local governments supervised by state courts. Because federal court adjudication of zoning
cases may be said to infringe upon this area of local decision-making, federal courts...
have on occasion refused to consider fully zoning challenges otherwise properly before them
"Federal court reluctance to consider the merits
of complicated exclusionary zoning
Fearing that active judicompetence.
concerning
judicial
cases is also motivated by doubts
cial intervention will lead to an unlimited judicial reordering of legislative schemes, the
Supreme Court has recently indicated that the federal judiciary should hesitate to find conId at 1660-61. Contra,
stitutional liability where broad social ills are implicated ......
Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1304-05
(1976).
118. 67 N.J. at 190, 336 A.2d at 733.
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court viewed the applicable region in the Mount Laurel case as the entire Camden metropolitan area extending to the Pennsylvania state
line.
For each community to bear a proportionately equal share of
every type of housing, however, may not be desirable or even rational
regional planning. The New Jersey Supreme Court was sensitive to
this problem, but concluded that "under present New Jersey legislation, zoning must be on an individualmunicipalbasis, ratherthan regional9. So long as that situation persists under the present tax structure
• . . we feel that every municipality. . must bear its fair share of the
regional burden."' 1 9
The Conservative Position of the Federal Courts
The California courts, in contrast to those of Pennsylvania and
New Jersey, have a long-established tradition of great liberality in upholding municipal zoning ordinances against almost any conceivable
challenge. 20 Consequently, many litigants attacking exclusionary zoning in California have filed their actions in federal court. That strategy,
however, invariably has proved unsuccessful.
The first such suit, Confederacionde la Raza Unida v. City ofMorgan Hil' 2 ' attacked restrictive zoning in the hilly region of a small
suburban community. The case was particularly inappropriate for raising arguments of exclusion because the restrictive zoning encompassed
only part of the community. Moreover, aesthetic and environmental
justifications supported the more restrictive provisions for the hillside
lots. The court accordingly rejected the plaintiffs' attack on the exclusionary features of the zoning without venturing into the difficult
problems underlying the exclusionary zoning issue.
The next federal decision involving California zoning, Ybarra v.
City of Town of Los Altos Hills122 concerned a suburban community
which zoned all undeveloped land for one acre residential lots. Plain119. Id at 189, 336 A.2d at 732-33 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
120. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976) (exclusionary); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 503, 542
P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975) (inverse condemnation); Builders Ass'n of Santa ClaraSanta Cruz Counties v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158
(1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976) (restrictive ordinance of limited duration);
Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973) (right to
travel); Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d 488, 108
Cal. Rptr. 271 (1973) (denial of equal protection).
121. 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
122. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
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tiffs, who wanted to construct multifamily housing, claimed the ordinance was invalid on three grounds: (1) that it denied due process
because it exceeded the community's authority to regulate land use
under the police power; (2) that it imposed an implicit wealth discrimination and thus denied the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it
did not contain a housing element which took account of the housing
23
needs of nonresidents. 1
Unsuccessful in the district court, 24 plaintiffs appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court rejected each of
plaintiffs' contentions and affirmed the court's decision below. The
court's opinion summarily dismissed plaintiffs' due process argument,
citing Village of Euclid 25 as controlling. Turning to the equal protection issue, the Ninth Circuit court viewed the matter from a regional
perspective, ruling against plaintiffs because they "failed to show that
adequate low-cost housing was unavailable elsewhere in . . . [the]
County in areas accessible to . . . [plaintiffs'] jobs and social services."' 126 Finally, the court ruled that California Government Code section 65302, which requires the city's general plan to include a housing
element that "shall make adequate provision for the housing needs of
all economic segments of the community"1 27 does not compel a city to
28
provide for the housing needs of nonresidents.1
Although Ybarra resembles Mount Laurel in its use of a regional
perspective, the ultimate conclusions of the Ninth Circuit court are antithetical to those of the New Jersey court. Under the Ybarra decision,
Los Altos Hills clearly is not required to meet its fair share of regional
housing needs; to the contrary, so long as other communities meet those
needs, Los Altos Hills can ignore them. This decision, moreover,
largely vitiated the usefulness of the required housing element. A
wealthy and exclusive suburb like Los Altos Hills undoubtedly has few
present residents living in overcrowded or inadequate housing. Thus,
123. California Government Code § 65302(c) requires that each community adopt a
general plan that includes a housing element which "shall make adequate provision for the
housing needs of all economic segments of the community." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(c)
(West Supp. 1966-1978). For a discussion of the housing element and the community to be
served see notes 170-203 & accompanying text infra. See generaly Knight, CaliforniaPlanning Law- Requirementsfor Low and Moderate Income Housing, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
§ 159 (1974); See Comment, A RegionalPerspectiveof the "General Welfare," 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1227 (1977).
124. 370 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
125. See note 112 & accompanying text supra.
126. 503 F.2d at 254.
127. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(c) (West Supp. 1966-1978).
128. 503 F.2d at 254.
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if the housing element only requires attention to the needs of present
residents, as Ybarra held, it imposes little or no obligation on such a
community.
In the next case addressed in the Ninth Circuit, ConstructionIndustry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petalumal2 9 the court reiterated the same permissive attitude toward exclusionary zoning that it
established in Ybarra. The City of Petaluma, a rural community facing
accelerating growth from the expanding San Francisco metropolitan
area, adopted a series of resolutions to limit projects involving five or
more units to 500 dwelling units annually. Under the "Petaluma
Plan," permits are awarded to projects which meet various objectives,
including provision for low and moderate income units. 130 Developers
must compete to determine which will receive permits from the limited
number available.
The federal district court had concluded that the Petaluma Plan
unconstitutionally impaired freedom of travel.13 ' Viewing that freedom as a fundamental right, it found no compelling interest to support
the exclusionary provisions of the plan. The court of appeals, however,
ruled that plaintiff, an association of builders, lacked standing to raise
the right to travel issue. Relying on Warth v. Seldin,' 32 the court stated
that although the builders were damaged by the restrictions of the plan,
"their economic interests are undisputedly outside the zone of interest
33
to be protected by any purported constitutional right to travel."'
The federal appellate court then turned to the question of whether
the Petaluma Plan violated the plaintiff's due process rights. Relying
on Village of Belle Terre v Boraas'34 and its own decision in Ybarra,135
the court found no denial of due process. In direct opposition to the
129. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
130. Because the Petaluma Plan limits only multi-family units, it has no effect on construction of individual residences. Its effect on multi-family residences is mixed; evidence
suggests that the number of units constructed would decline, but that the proportion of low
and moderate cost units would increase. Id at 902.
131. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rep'd,522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1976).
132. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Warth held that a person attacking exclusionary zoning must
allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the practice inflicts personal harms, and
that a tangible personal benefit will flow from judicial action. Applying this test of standing,
the Supreme Court denied standing to the following: (1) low income residents of the excluding community; (2) taxpayers of that community; (3) a civic organization with resident and
nonresident members; (4) an association of housing contractors; and (5) a metropolitan
housing council.
133. 522 F.2d at 904.
134. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Belle Terre upheld a village ordinance prohibiting rental of a
residence to more than two unrelated persons. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance
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Pennsylvania and New Jersey cases cited earlier, 136 the court ruled that
the plan need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest and held that preserving the rural character and environment of
the community was such a legitimate interest. "If the present system of
delegated zoning power does not effectively serve the state interest in
furthering the general welfare of the region," the court concluded, "it is
the state legislature's and not the federal courts' role to intervene and
137
adjust the system."'
For California opponents of exclusionary zoning, the federal cases
represented a pattern of frustration. The courts' language did not absolutely bar attack on such zoning, but somehow the attacker could never
put together the combination of the right plaintiff, the right arguments,
and the right evidence. Perhaps this pattern was not accidental; if the
federal courts had resolved not to involve themselves in what they considered a state legislative matter, a litigant who breached one line of
resistance simply would encounter the next barrier. In Ybarra, for example, plaintiffs did not prevail ostensibly because they failed to present evidence from a regional perspective; however, when plaintiffs in
the Petaluma case presented evidence of regional impact, they were
13 8
told it was irrelevant.
The Compromise Position of the California Supreme Court
Despite the extensive litigation on exclusionary zoning in other
states and the actions discussed above in the federal courts in California, as of 1975 no exclusionary zoning issue had ever come before the
California appellate courts. The issue reached the state supreme court
that year in a curious fashion. The court granted a hearing in three
cases to decide the question of whether municipal voters could adopt
zoning ordinances by initiative, a question irrelevant to the issues of
exclusionary zoning, except for the fact that in two of the three cases
the zoning initiatives were arguably of exclusionary character. The
court selected San Diego Building ContractorsAssociation v. City Council, 13 9 the only case without an exclusionary issue, as its lead case and
held that charter cities could zone by initiative. In the second case,
bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective, namely, the preservation of "family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air." Id at 9.
135. See notes 122-28 & accompanying text supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 94-111 supra.
137. 522 F.2d at 908.
138. Id.
139. 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974).
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Builders Association of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties v. Superior
Court, 40 the supreme court upheld the charter city of San Jose's initia-

tive imposing a two year moritorium on rezoning of property to residential use in part of the city suffering from overloaded schools. The
decision noted the builders' claim that the initiative denied due process

of law and impaired a constitutional right to travel, but concluded that
because the act imposed only a brief limitation on only a portion of the
city, the case did not raise a question involving substantial abridgement

of constitutional rights.141
The remaining case, Associated Home Builders of the Greater

Eastbay,Inc. v. City of Livermore,142 primarily concerned the question
of whether a general law city, as contrasted with a charter city, could
zone by initiative. When the court ruled in favor of the city's power,
however, it was then required to determine the validity of a city-wide
prohibition on issuance of residential building permits of allegedly

temporary, yet uncertain, duration.
The Livermore initiative prohibited issuance of further building
permits until educational, sewage treatment, and water supply facilities
complied with standards set out in the initiative. 43 The developers attacked the initiative on two grounds: first, that it infringed a constitu-

tionally protected right to travel, and second, that it exceeded the city's
authority under the police power and thus constituted a deprivation of
substantive due process.
If the ordinance abridged a fundamental right, current constitu-

tional doctrine might invalidate it unless it was justified as necessary to
140. 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974).
141. The court noted that "[t]he zoning freeze established by the initiative here at issue
is limited to two years duration, and applies only to that portion of the city plagued with the
problem of overcrowded schools. Even within that portion of the city, the ordinance permits
rezoning if the developer will agree to assist the school district in meeting the need for additional facilities which his development has created. Consequently the initiative need not
serve to exclude newcomers from San Jose; it may, instead simply divert some development
to districts with adequate school facilities, while providing overcrowded districts with the
means to accommodate the needs of new residents." Id at 233, 529 P.2d at 587, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 163.
142. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
143. The court rejected the contention that the ordinance was void for vagueness. The
vagueness issue arose because the ordinance prohibited issuance of building permits until
the problem of overcrowded classrooms was solved, but did not define what would constitute an acceptable solution. The court found that the ordinance was probably intended to
incorporate a definition of adequate classroom space contained in a local school district
resolution. To uphold the constitutionality of the statute, the court interpreted its terms to
incorporate the resolution's definition. Id at 596-98, 557 P.2d at 481-82, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
49-50.
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serve a compelling state interest.44 The court, however, held that the
ordinance did not abridge a fundamental right to travel as the ordiby discriminating
nance did not "directly burden" the right to travel
t45
against nonresidents or newly arrived residents.
Turning to the due process issue, the Livermore court first reiterated the permissive test of past decisions-that an ordinance is valid if
it has a "reasonable relation to the public welfare.' 146 The decision
nevertheless promptly set about to modify that standard. First, follow144. State or local action which infringes upon a fundamental right is judged by a "strict
scrutiny" standard of review. Where fundamental rights are involved, ie., the right to vote,
the right to interstate travel, and the right to freedom of association, equal protection arguments are raised, and the state has the heavy burden of proving that the regulation serves a
"compelling state interest." This standard is to be contrasted with the lesser burden of showing that an ordinance bears "a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective" normally invoked upon due process challenges. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,8
(1974) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)). For cases dealing with fundamental
rights and strict scrutiny, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(right to freedom of association). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 TermForward"In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a ChangingCourt. A Modelfor a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-18 (1972); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal
Protection Clause, and The Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 95054 (1975); Comment, FundamentalPersonalRights.- Another Approach to Equal Protection,
40 U. CHI. L. REv. 807, 807-09, 812-17 (1973); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and
Equal Protection,82 YALE L.J. 123, 146-49 (1972).
145. 18 Cal. 3d at 602-04, 557 P.2d at 484-85, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 52-53. For cases invalidating legislation on grounds that it directly burdened the right to travel by discriminating
against nonresidents and newly arrived residents see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (residency requirements imposed to restrict eligibility for medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (residency requirements imposed to restrict eligibility for voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (residency
requirements imposed to restrict eligibility for welfare); In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 474 P.2d
983, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1970) (penal code provision making the failure to provide support
payments a misdemeanor when father resided in California, but imposing a felony when the
father resided out of state). But see Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (social security
benefits denied to persons residing outside the United States does not abridge the right to
travel); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (an ordinance which in effect
limits migration to a community does not necessarily abridge a fundamental right to travel).
See generally Note, The Right to Travel and Exclusionary Zoning, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 849
(1975); Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1129 (1975);
Comment, The Right to Travel. Another ConstitutionalStandardforLocal Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. CH. L. REV. 612 (1972).
146. 18 Cal. 3d at 604, 557 P.2d at 486, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54. See Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382
P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963); Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 202
P.2d 38, 42 (1949); Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 490, 234 P. 381, 385
(1925); Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d 488, 50809, 108 Cal. Rptr. 271, 286-87 (1971).
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ing the lead of the Mount Laurel decision, 147 the court held that the

ordinance must bear a reasonable relationship to the regional, not
merely the municipal, welfare. Second, in an oblique reference to the
California tradition of invariably upholding zoning ordinances attacked under the due process clause, the court stated that "it cannot be
assumed that a land use ordinance can never be invalidated as an en-

actment in excess of the police power."' 148 The court noted "Judicial

deference to legislative judgment is not judicial abdication. The ordinance must have a real and substantial relation to the public wel49
fare." 1

Having established its test of a real and substantial relationship to
the regional welfare, the Livermore court found the record inadequate
to determine the constitutionality of the initiative ordinance. Trusting

that Livermore and regional agencies would attempt ingood faith to
provide necessary educational, sewage, and water facilities-and thus
that the ordinance imposed only a temporary moratorium-the court
called for evidence on the likely duration and effect of the moratorium
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
As Justice Mosk pointed out in his dissent, the Livermore majority's presumption of good faith can be called into question. 5 0 The or-

dinance itself contained no terms providing for construction of needed
facilities. If the community really wanted to speed construction, a
more rational method than a total moratorium would be to permit de-

velopment which contributed toward construction of the facilities. In
addition, one stated purpose of the initiative-preventing further air
pollution-cannot be achieved by constructing new educational, sew147. See notes 103-19 & accompanying text supra.
148. 18 Cal. 3d at 609, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
149. Id A comment in the Livermore decision may forecast a further expansion ofjudicial action in the exclusionary area. The court distinguished the activist approach of Mount
Laureland the Pennsylvania decisions on the ground that those cases involved "ordinances
which impeded the ability of low or moderate income persons to immigrate to a community
but permit largely unimpeded entry by wealthier persons." Id at 606, 557 P.2d at 487, 135
Cal. Rptr. at 55. See discussion in Note, The Needfor Accommodation in Growth Control
Ordinances: AssociatedHomebuilders of the GreaterEastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 12
U.S.F. L. REv. 357, 372-75 (1978).
The Livermore ordinance, the court pointed out, lacked this characteristic. It barred all
residential construction regardless of lot size, floor space, or single family character. But in
this respect the Livermore ordinance is exceptional; most exclusionary zoning ordinances
permit construction of expensive single-family residences on very large lots, thus presenting
issues of wealth discrimination. The Livermore decision leaves open the possibility that such
ordinances will not receive the judicial deference granted zoning ordinances in past decisions.
150. Id at 622-23, 557 P.2d at 497, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 65 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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age, and water facilities, but only by excluding prospective residents
indefinitely.
If viewed as an exclusionary measure of indefinite duration, the
constitutionality of the Livermore ordinance would depend on whether
a rational regional planning board would adopt such a measure.' 5 '
The objectives set out in the initiative's standards-improvement of
schools, water supply, and sewage facilities-probably could be
achieved through less drastic means, and thus might not justify a total
ban on residential construction. The Livermore Basin, however, is
known to have the worst air pollution problem in the San Francisco
metropolitan area. 152 Arguably a regional board, taking note of that
problem might rationally decide to divert all new construction to other
localities until some method is discovered for reducing the air pollution
of the Livermore Basin.
The Livermore decision represents a compromise position on the
issues of exclusionary zoning. On the one hand, it adopts the regional
welfare approach of Mount Laurel, and warns that courts may use that
test to strike down exclusionary ordinances; on the other hand, it adheres to the traditional "reasonable relation" test and to traditional respect for legislative judgment. A certain anomaly underlies this
compromise, for Livermore entrusts local legislative bodies with the
power to enact ordinances whose validity is measured by a regional
welfare standard. The Pennsylvania and New Jersey courts were emphatic in their assertions that local bodies cannot be trusted to take
regional needs into account. Future cases in California, perhaps coupled with the experience of New York courts operating under a similar
precedent, 153 will indicate whether the California court acted unrealis151. See Note, The Needfor Accommodation In Growth Control Ordinances: Associated
Homebuilders ofthe Greater Eastbay, Inc. v.City ofLivermore, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 357, 382
(1978).
152. See STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, A HANDBOOK FOR CONTROLLING
LOCAL GROWTH 90 (1973).
153. The Livermore compromise finds support in a decision of the New York court of
appeal. In Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d
672 (1975), a decision roughly contemporaneous with the Livermore decision, the New York
court reviewed a community zoning ordinance which made no provision for multiple family
housing. The court reiterated its view that the purpose of zoning is to provide a "balanced,
cohesive community which will make efficient use of the town's available land." Id at 109,
341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680, (citing Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30
N.Y.2d 359, 378, 285 N.E.2d 291, 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 152 (1972), appeal dismissed,409
U.S. 1003 (1972), the leading decision upholding a community plan providing for phased
growth.) As did the California court in Livermore, the New York court reached beyond
existing state precedent to add the requirement that communities must consider regional
needs. The New York court, in explaining this requirement, noted that "a town need not
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tically in its trust of local legislatures and, if that trust proves misplaced, whether judicial review under the Livermore precedent will
suffice to correct the harm.
In the years since the Livermore decision, only one reported California decision has faced the problems of exclusionary zoning. The
second decision by the court of appeal in Eldridge v. City of Palo
Alto,1 54 a case most noted for its discussion of down-zoning issues, encompassed a related action, Beyer v. City ofPaloAlto, which was consolidated with the Eldridge case at the appellate level. As noted in the
5 5 the City of Palo Alto had zoned
previous discussion of Eldridge,1
about 6000 acres of foothill land, most of the remaining undeveloped
land in the city, as open space. The zoning permitted only one residence per ten acres and provided for public hiking access. Plaintiff
Beyer, unlike Eldridge, asserted the ordinance was unconstitutional exclusionary zoning. The court of appeal majority rejected this contention, holding that the environmental purposes of the ordinance lay
within the police power. The majority went on to emphasize that the
law was beyond constitutional attack, except in proceedings for inverse
56
condemnation.
permit a use solely for the sake of the people of the region if regional needs are presently
provided for in an adequate manner." Id at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 242-43, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
This is essentially the holding of the Ninth Circuit in Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503
F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974), and arguably inconsistent with the "fair share of the burden" approach of the New Jersey courts. See notes 103-19 & accompanying text supra. Finally, in a
holding again parallel to Livermore, the New York Court of Appeal concluded that the
record before it was inadequate to determine whether the zoning reasonably related to the
regional welfare, and accordingly remanded the case to the trial court.
154. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
155. See text accompanying notes 45-56 supra.
156. Justice Sims, dissenting, noted the substantial issues of exclusionary zoning
presented by the Palo Alto ordinance but concluded that Beyer, having sold his property
during the litigation, lacked standing to raise them. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 653-55 & n.14, 129
Cal. Rptr. at 601-02 (1976).,
The brevity of the court's discussion of the Beyer issues obscures some of the interesting
features of the case. The former zoning, which Beyer wanted restored, permitted one house
per acre of land, a typical exclusionary zoning ordinance which serves to limit entry to the
wealthy. The new open space zoning, however, despite its provision for one house per ten
acres, was not designed to create an elite suburb for the super-wealthy. Instead, its primary
purpose was the preservation of a fragile environment, and allowing one house for ten acres
was probably a minimum concession designed to reduce the danger that the ordinance
would be held an unconstitutional taking.
Consequently, although Beyer raised issues of exclusionary zoning, the principal attack
he and Eldridge leveled against the open space zoning was that the city was taking their land
for a park without paying for it. When a city acquires a park, and refuses to sell or lease
park land for housing, its acts are clearly exclusionary, but so far as we are aware it has
never been suggested that such acts are unconstitutional. Yet if the primary purpose of
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The supreme court's recent decision in Agins overruled Eldridge to
the extent that the latter case conflicted with the Agins holding limiting
a landowner's remedy for unconstitutionally restrictive zoning to an action to invalidate the ordinance.1 57 The Eldridge conclusion that the
Palo Alto zoning was a valid exercise of the police power was superficially consistent with Agins, and thus was not expressly overruled.
Agins, however, appears to rest on the theory that an ordinance so restrictive that it constitutes a taking is necessarily an act in excess of the
police power. Under that theory a court could not hold, as Eldridge did,
that the same restrictive zoning is both a taking and a valid exercise of
the police power. To that extent the Eldridge court's conclusion that
the extremely restrictive Palo Alto zoning was constitutional may be
vitiated by the Agins decision.
Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning
A number of writers have proposed that courts remedy exclusionary zoning by awarding damages in inverse condemnation to persons
harmed by such zoning. 58 The following discussion focuses on the
most prominent of those proposals, that advanced by Professor Ellickson. Ellickson argues that under certain economic assumptions the economically optimum level of growth, and the most equitable
distribution of the cost and benefits of growth, would result if cities
paid to landowners damages attributable to restrictive measures. He
first distinguishes between subnormal land use, defined as use less socially desirable than the norm permitted in the community, and normal
or above normal use.' 59 When a government prohibits a subnormal
use, the landowner recovers damages only upon proof that the restric160
tion is grossly inefficient, i e., that its costs vastly exceed its benefits.
If the government prohibits a normal or above normal use, however,
constitutional limits on exclusionary zoning is to protect interests of prospective residents
and to safeguard the regional welfare, the fact that the landowner received just compensation for his property should be irrelevant.
157. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 23 Cal.3d 605, 612, 591 P.2d 514, 518 (1979). The language from Agins is quoted in text accompanying note 59 supra.
158. See Badler, Municioal Zoning Liability in Damages-A New Cause of Action, 5
URB. LAW. 25 (1973); Berger, A PolicyAnalysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV.

165, 210-11 (1974); Ellickson, supra note 24, at 507-11; Note, Inverse Condemnation: The
Casefor Diminution in Property Value as Compensable Damage, 28 STAN. L. REV. 779
(1976). Contra,Note, Eldridgev. City ofPal Alto: Aberration or New Directionin Land Use
Law?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569 (1977); Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance,26 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (1974).

159.
160.

Ellickson, supra note 24, at 419 & n.86.
Id. at 419.
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the landowner establishes a prima facie case by proving a substantial
diminution in value.' 6 1 Under Ellickson's proposal, the municipality
must then assume the burden of proving both that the restriction is
economically efficient and that it is fair to the landowner. A restriction
is fair whenever the landowner should be able to recognize that as a
taxpayer his or her own long term self-interest in avoiding the administrative costs of minor compensatory payments makes it fair to deny
compensation.' 62 Finally, he proposes a class action on behalf of consumers of housing in which plaintiffs must prove that the restrictive
zoning increased regional housing prices. The city could defend by
proving efficiency and fairness. 63 Any award would compensate attorneys and households proving specific injury, with the balance escheating to the state.' 64
There are, however, certain theoretical, practical, and procedural
difficulties which argue against judicial adoption of this proposal.' 65
Many of these difficulties will have the effect of deterring cities from
adopting restrictive measures even though such measures are necessary
66
to achieve optimal economic efficiency and fairness under the model.
First, the model assumes that rational suburban landowners will
pay higher taxes willingly to finance the damage awards occasioned by
the suburb's restrictive measures, so long as the restrictions increase the
owner's land value by more than the taxes. As a practical matter, most
often the landowner taxpayer will not agree to such proposals. Increased taxes are immediate losses, while land appreciation is only
speculative. More importantly, appreciation can be realized only on
sale, and thus must be discounted by the costs and taxes incident to
sale. Finally, many homeowners, for reasons both economic and
noneconomic, are unwilling to sell. For them, land appreciation does
not offset increased taxes. The fear that higher taxes, even if accompanied by appreciation, might compel landowners to sell was among the
forces behind the passage of Proposition 13 in California. As a result,
161. Id
162. Id
163. Id at 498-99.
164. Id at 500.
165. For a more extensive theoretical criticism of Professor Ellickson's theory, see Roberts, An Appropriate Model for Judicial Review of Suburban Growth Controls (1974) (unpublished manuscript).
166. Under Ellickson's model, a city's failure to impose zoning restrictions may result in
construction of more housing than is economically optimal. The economic ideal, avoiding
the economic costs of either too much or too little housing, under some circumstances can be
achieved only if the city imposes restrictions and pays damages to the landowners affected.
Ellickson, supra note 24, at 444-46.
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landowners will discount the value of appreciation as against the cost
of taxes and thus, under Ellickson's model, impose less restrictive
growth limitations than the economic optimum.
Second, Ellickson's distinction between normal and subnormal
uses will not commend itself to egalitarians. He defines a subnormal
use as one less socially desirable than the norm permitted in the community. Thus, in Los Altos Hills, with uniform one acre zoning, half
acre lots are subnormal. In Ellickson's model, limiting or excluding
newcomers is easier for the wealthy suburbs than for less wealthy suburbs, even though the latter are likely to be experiencing much greater
congestion costs.
Third, the model necessarily assumes that a majority of landowners can raise taxes to pay damages awards. In post-Proposition 13 California, this is not the case. 167 Knowing taxes cannot be raised and that
a substantial award for interim damages will devastate an already tight
budget, city councils will hesitate to enact any but the most innocuous
restrictions.
Finally, Ellickson's proposed consumer class action is questionable
procedurally. Ellickson notes that the administrative costs of distributing the award to prospective consumers usually would be unacceptably
high,' 68 but the problem goes deeper: how does one even identify the
consumers who have 4 right of action? Would testimony by an economist that a suburb's exclusionary policy has raised regional housing
costs make all recent purchasers of houses, and their tenants, members
of the plaintiff class? The proposed action may well be viewed by
many jurisdictions as a suit on behalf of a nonascertainable class, the
at reasonable expense, and may
members of which cannot be notified
69
thus be an improper class action.'
The Housing Element in the Community General Plan; Its Future Impact on
Exclusionary Zoning
California's statutorily mandated housing element, Government
167.
168.

See note 62 supra.
Ellickson, supra note 24, at 500.

169.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) states the initial prerequisites to a federal

class action: "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractica-

ble, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a).

September 1979]

CALIFORNIA ZONING LAW

Code section 65302(c), 70° may serve as a basis for challenging exclusionary zoning ordinances. The California Zoning and Planning Law,
Government Code section 65302, requires that every city and county

adopt a comprehensive general plan which contains certain mandatory
elements, including provisions for open space and housing. The law
the
further requires that local zoning ordinances be consistent with
7

community's general plan, including the mandatory elements.' '
The housing element of the general plan consists of standards and
plans for the improvement and adequate siting of housing. Under section 65302(c) that element must "make adequate provision for the
housing needs of all economic segments of the community."' 7 2 Pursuant to regulations authorized by the statute, the 1977 Housing Element
Guidelines (Guidelines) were adopted. 17 3 These Guidelines, which are
mandatory regulations to be followed in the development and implementation of the local housing element, 74 require that localities com170. The statute in relevant part provides: "The general plan shall consist of a statement
of development policies and shall include a diagram or diagrams and text setting forth
objectives, principles, standards, and plan proposals. The plan shall include the following
elements:

"(c) A housing element, to be developed pursuant to regulations established under
Section 41134 of the Health and Safety Code, consisting of standards and plans for the
improvement of housing and for provision of adequate sites for housing. This element of
the plan shall make adequate provision for the housing needs of all economic segments of
the community." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West Supp. 1966-1978).
171. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1966-1978). See id §§ 65101(a), 65910.
172. Id § 65302(c).
173. 25 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 6400-6478 (West 1977). The Housing Element Guidelines were developed pursuant to regulations established under § 41134 (renumbered
§ 50459) of the Health and Safety Code. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50459 (West
1979). Final responsibility for their development, adoption, and review rests with the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) as authorized by
Health and Safety Code § 50456 and Government Code § 65302(c). See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65302(c) (West Supp. 1966-1978); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50456 (West 1979).
The original Housing Element Guidelines, adopted by the Housing and Community
Development Commission in 1971 and promulgated as emergency regulations in August,
1977, were so terse that they were ineffective in carrying out the mandate of § 65302(c), the
housing element. Knight, CaliforniaPlanning Law: Requiremenisfor Low and Moderate
Income Housing, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REv. S 159, S163 (1974); Note, CaliforniaLower Income
Housing Policy: At Legislative and Judicial Crossroads,29 HASTINGS L.J. 793, 797 (1978).
Moreover, since the commission failed to adopt the original Guidelines pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, they were not binding on the localities. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 11371, 11373-11374, 11420, 11423-11425 (West 1966 & Supp. 1978).
174. These Guidelines have been challenged on the grounds that they are not
mandatory, but rather advisory. The opinions of the Attorney General indicate that they are
to be binding regulations. 55 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 380 (1972). Additional strength is added to
this contention by the requirement that the procedure followed for adopting such Guidelines
conform to the procedure outlined for promulgating mandatory regulations under the Cali-
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ply with their provisions by mid 1979-1980, depending upon the
region. 7 5 The purpose of the Guidelines is to make specific the general
legislative mandate of the housing element.176 As interpretative regulations, the Guidelines serve as a yardstick against which local housing
compliance is measured to determine whether adequate provision has
77
been made for all economic sectors of the community.1
Because local housing policies and plans have regional as well as
local impact, the Guidelines define a locality's responsibility to the
community in terms of the housing needs of its resident population,
analyzed under a regional framework. The localities share the collective responsibility of providing for the housing needs of all economic
segments of the community within a general housing market area.178
This regional responsibility approach is similar to the standards set by
the New Jersey court in Mount Laurel1 79 for determining the validity of
a restrictive zoning ordinance. The Guidelines thus require that the
housing element "be responsive to the housing needs of afair share of
those households who do not live in the locality but whose housing
opportunities are affected by planning decisions of the locality."'18 0
Fair share allocation plans authorize the Department of Housing
and Community Development to assist regional planning bodies in the
preparation and evaluation of their fair share responsibilities.' 81 In
fornia Administration Procedure Act. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11371-11427 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1979). And, in the opinion of the Attorney General, regulations adopted in accordance with that act are ordinarily intended to be binding. 28 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 227, 233 (1956).
See also Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. City Council of Arcadia, 42 Cal. App. 3d 712, 723-24, 117
Cal. Rptr. 96, 102-03 (1974); D. BRYANT, CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL LOWER INCOME
HOUSING LAWS at 2-4 to 2-6 (1978); Note, Caiffornia Lower Income Housing Policy At
Legislative and Judicial Crossroads, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 793, 798 (1978).
175. 25 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 6478 (West 1977).
176. Id § 6406.
177. Id
178. Id § 6418. "General housing market area" is defined as a regional geographic
unit. Id § 6410(0.
179. See text accompanying notes 103-19 supra. In fact, the Guidelines use language
much like that of the New Jersey court in defining the community to be served by the local
housing element as including a fair share of those persons "who would live within the local
jurisdiction were a variety and choice of housing appropriate to their needs available." 25
CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 6418 (1977); See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 179-81, 187-88, 336 A.2d 713, 728, 731-32, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 808 (1975).
180. 25 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 6418 (1977) (emphasis added).
181. Id § 6420. If regional councils failed to allocate market area needs among the
localities within the general area by the July 1, 1978, deadline, the Department of Housing
and Community Development had authority to perform the allocation which had been delegated to the regional planning body. Id § 6424.
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providing for the economic needs of all segments of the community, the
focus of the fair share allocation models is on nonmarket-rate (lowincome) households. l82 The plans provide localities 183 with a general
measure and presumptive indentification of housing needs for which
adequate provision must be made in the housing element. The fair
share allocation plans must identify both the immediate and projected
regional housing needs of nonmarket-rate households and assign to
each locality a fair share of this estimated need. Finally, the Housing
in
Guidelines adopt the language of Government Code section 65300.5
84
requiring internal consistency among general plan elements.
The housing element of the general plan as defined by the Guidelines thus provides a statutory basis for challenging an exclusionary
zoning ordinance. 8 5 Moreover, it provides the courts with a criteria or
standard against which local planning and zoning compliance may be
measured, thus solving the problem of courts acting as zoning boards
or "superlegislators," an area in which their competence is questiona86
ble.'
To date, no court has interpreted section 65302(c), the housing element provision, in conjunction with the 1977 Guidelines. 187 The
182. Low-income housing is referred to as "nonmarket-rate households" in the Guidelines. Id § 6410(p).
183. For the purposes of the Guidelines, "'Locality' means any county, city and county,
or city including charter cities." Id § 6410(k).
184. Id § 6464.
185. It is of interest to note the comments of the authors of a 1974 work entitled InZoning: A Guidefor Policy Makers on Inclusionary Land Use Programs. They note that
Government Code § 65302 "might provide a model for [mandatory low-income housing]
legislation if it were extended to land use enabling legislation and if regional considerations
were made more explicit. But the policy of such a statute might still have to be vindicated
through litigation in a locality that ignored its mandate." H. FRANKLIN, D. GALK & A.
LEVIN, IN-ZONING: A GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PRO-

37, 48 n.28 (1974).
186. See note 117 supra. But see Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d
250 (9th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 122-28 supra. The specific Guidelines to
which this Article refers, however, were not in effect at the time of Ybarra. Only the general
mandate of § 65302(c) existed without specific, mandatory guidelines to define their scope.
See note 3 supra. In fact, the Guidelines to which this Article refers will not become operative until mid 1979-1980, although earlier compliance, if practicable, is recommended. 25
Cal. Admin. Code § 6478 (1977). See also Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore,
18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
187. The Ninth Circuit construed the housing element provision, Government Code
§ 65302(c), in Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974).
Two other cases, Leonard v. City of El Cerrito, I Civ. No. 34763 (Ct. of Appeal, 1st Dist.,
filed Mar. 26, 1974), and Orange County Fair Housing Council v. City of Irvine, Civ. No.
225824 (Orange County Super. Ct., filed Mar. 5, 1975), also were concerned with the housing element. The El Cerrito decision was decertified for publication by the California
GRAMS
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Guidelines themselves, however, provide for judicial review of the local
housing elements. 88 Under this statutory framework, challenges to exclusionary zoning ordinances may take several forms. Because section
65302 requires all localities to adopt a general plan which provides for
the economic needs of all segments of the community, any regulation
which is at variance with this mandate is open to challenge. 189 Large
lot zoning, which increases the cost of housing that can be built and
thereby excludes all but expensive housing and affluent families, or
which shifts a larger than proportionate burden of low-income housing
to surrounding communities, may be viewed as inconsistent with the
housing element's mandate. Further, the locality's plan itself provides
a ready standard against which a court can measure zoning compliance. 190
A locality cannot avoid its planning obligation by failing to adopt
one of the mandatory elements of the general plan. In Save El Toro
Association v. Days,' 9 t the city's failure to adopt a legally sufficient
open space element as part of a comprehensive plan, and its failure to
adopt a sufficient independent open space plan, barred the city from
acquiring, regulating, or restricting open space land. The court noted
that California law requires that a city's zoning ordinances be consistent with its general plan. 192 Because the city had failed to adopt, inter
93
alia, the required open space element, its general plan was deficient. 1
As zoning must be consistent with a valid general plan, and the city
lacked a valid general plan, it legally could not regulate its open space
94
lands. 1
Supreme Court at the request of the State Attorney General's Office. The Irvine case was
settled.
Although these cases provide no binding judicial precedent, they do suggest the availability of Government Code § 65302(c) and the Guidelines as a basis to force local governments to comply with the housing element mandate.
188. 25 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 6474 (1977).
189. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1966-1978). In addition, regulations must
also be consistent with the Guidelines which define and interpret the housing element. Id
§ 65300.5; 25 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 6464 (1977).
190. Since a locality's plan must be adopted in accordance with fair share allocation
criteria and be based upon a regional perspective, it provides "presumptive indentification"
of housing needs for which adequate provision must be made. 25 CAL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 6422 (1977).
191. 74 Cal. App. 3d 64, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1977).
192. Id at 70, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 286 (citing CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65567 (West Supp. 19661978)).
193. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 72-73, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
194. Id at 73, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 287. The city also could have adopted an open space
plan independently of a general plan, but it failed to comply with the state requirements for
such an open space plan. Id at 74, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
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The El Toro case offers, by analogy, a method by which one could
challenge an exclusionary zoning ordinance in cases in which the city
has failed to adopt either a valid housing element or a valid open space
element in its general plan. 95 Because zoning ordinances must be consistent with all mandatory elements of the general plan, 196 the ordinance fails this consistency requirement if the plan is deficient in any
respect.
The housing element and Guidelines, in addition to providing a

statutory framework and criteria under which exclusionary practices
may be challenged, impliedly expand the number of persons who will
have standing to sue. The community to be served by the local housing
element is defined as including a fair share of those persons "who
would live within the local jurisdiction were a variety and choice of
housing appropriate to their needs available."' 197 Therefore, any resi-

dent or property owner within a general housing market, not just the
locality, may bring an action against a city which has failed to meet its
fair share responsibility.198 Additionally, local housing policies necessarily have regional as well as local impact. Arguably, any adjacent
city within a housing market area also could challenge a city's zoning
practices if forced to bear a larger than proportionate share of the re-

gional housing burden. 199

Summary: The Present Status of Exclusionary Zoning
The diverse positions taken by the courts in exclusionary zoning
195. A question remains whether the courts can rely on the required housing element,
not only to nullify exclusionary ordinances, but also to compel adoption of zoning which
will fulfill the objective of providing for the housing needs of all segments of the community.
The statutes are clear enough: the housing element is an essential part of the general plan,
and zoning must conform to the general plan. In Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors, 22
Cal. 3d 644, 586 P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978), however, the trial court refused to issue
mandamus to compel the county to amend its zoning to conform to the county general plan
on the ground that rezoning was a legislative matter beyond judicial control. The California
Supreme Court granted a hearing, but subsequent to oral argument the county amended its
zoning ordinance, rendering the issue moot. See Hagman & Dimento, The ConsistencyRequirement in Caif/ornia,30 ZONING DIGEST 5 (1978), suggesting that "[ijn the event of inconsistency [between a zoning ordinance and the general plan], a court is not likely to
invalidate the zoning, but it might compel adoption of a plan." Id (footnotes omitted).
196. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1966-1978).
197. 25 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 6418 (1977).
198. See 25 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 6418, 6474 (1977). See text accompanying notes 10319, 172-79 supra for a discussion of the "regional responsibility" approach adopted by the
New Jersey and California courts. But see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860(b) (West Supp. 19661978).
199. See note 198 supra. See also 25 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 6448(b) (1977).
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cases reflect the fact that the problem presents substantial and genuine
interests to be balanced. As described by Justice Tobriner in
Livermore: "We allude to the conflict between the environmental protectionists and the egalitarian humanists," to the conflict between
"[s]uburban residents who seek to. .. secure the 'blessing of quiet seclusion and clean air' and to 'make the area a sanctuary for people'"
and "outsiders searching for a place to live in the face of a growing
''2 °°
shortage of adequate housing.
All of the cases acknowledge, at least implicitly, the validity of
these competing interests. They differ principally in their view of how
the judiciary should respond to the traditionally legislative task of accommodating those interests. Some cases, notably the federal decisions, 20 1 take the position that the matter is one for decision by
whichever body has legislative jurisdiction, and that the legislative
body's decision is entitled to the full measure of deference and respect.
In practice, this means that municipalities can exclude or not as they
choose. That result would be intolerable if most chose to exclude, but
so long as many favor expansion and development, it may provide a
workable answer. If matters changed and exclusion became the rule,
presumably the courts or, more likely, a superior legislative body such
as a regional planning council, could then intervene.
Other decisions, principally those of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, refuse to entrust local legislative bodies with such discretionary power. 20 2 A true regional body, the courts intimate, would be
allowed to weigh the competing interests, and render a decision entitled
to judicial deference. Local bodies, however, are suspected of bias
against outsiders, and can overcome this suspicion only by zoning to
take their fair share of urban growth.
The two most populous states, California and New York, have
adopted a compromise position, imposing a regional test yet entrusting
local legislative bodies to implement it.203 The theoretical appeal of
this position is clear; there are, after all, substantial values at stake on
both sides of this issue, and only a decision which recognizes and attempts to accommodate the competing values would appear to provide
a satisfactory solution. In practice, however, this compromise position
puts a great burden on the trial courts, which without explicit appellate
200.

18 Cal. 3d 582, 608-09, 557 P.2d 473, 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 56 (1976) (quoting

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974)).
201.
202.
203.

See text accompanying notes 120-38 supra.
See text accompanying notes 94-119 supra.
See text accompanying notes 139-57 supra.
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guidance necessarily must evaluate a mountain of economic, demographic, and environmental data. The workability of this approach
will turn on the ability of trial courts to digest the data and determine
whether local exclusionary restrictions represent rational regional planning.
Finally, California's statutory requirement that a community's
general plan include a housing element sensitive to regional needs may
provide a legislative and administrative resolution to the issue of exclusionary zoning, removing the burden from the courts. The guidelines,
however, have not yet been tested. We do not know how they will fare
at the hands of hostile municipal governments, how they will survive
litigation, or what the legislative response would be if the guidelines
really proved effective in nullifying numerous restrictive ordinances.
We venture the prediction that decisions under the guidelines will
not differ substantially from decisions based on judicial precedent.
Most exclusionary zoning controversies present legitimate and substantial interests on each side of the controversy. A community plan which
attempts in good faith to weigh and accommodate competing interests,
on a regional as well as a local level, will survive attack. Plans which
appear attuned only to local interests are in danger of invalidation.

